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 We consider a model of small open economy of Sidrauski type with foreign 
currency, and derive conditions of optimal, stationary, and consistent in time 
macroeconomic policy. In particular, for its policy to be consistent in time, the 
government has to be honestly committed to respect consumers’ welfare and external 
debt. An optimal policy in our model is characterized by an equal marginal contribution 
to the budget of the income and inflation taxes. We produce an analogous policy rule for 
the endogenous growth framework. 
In the empirical part of the paper we calibrate our model on the basis of the 
Russian data for the post-1998 period, which was characterized by relatively low inflation 
but high level of dollarization. We find that excessive dollarization has had a negative 
impact on consumers’ welfare and inflation. Moreover, we find that, given the estimated 
level of currency substitution (> 1), optimal policy may be unattainable.  
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JEL classification: E00 
Governments cover their expenditures with the help of taxes, money emission, and 
borrowing. What are the optimal sizes and proportions of these sources? Which 
conditions supply the consistency in time property of optimal policies? How can be 
characterized such policies? These questions are studied in the literature long ago, see for 
the papers and references Handbook of Monetary Economics [1]. In the present paper we 
give certain answers on them in the framework of the Sidrauski model (1967) with 
domestic and foreign currencies. The model with money in utility function seems to cede 
to the direct modeling of the liquidity services. However in some conditions these 
approaches are equivalent (see Feenstra (1986)), and besides, the Sidrauski model is more 
convenient for studying the welfare effects of foreign currency that we are going to 
evaluate here.  
Probably Ramsey (1927) was the first who raised the policy optimization problem 
concerning the structure of taxes. He obtained a compact relation where goods were taxed 
according to the elasticities of the demand on them. The interest to  the optimization 
settings  regenerated after the war along with developing  the equilibrium analysis, 
studying the hyperinflation episodes in some countries, and related to them welfare losses 
(see Bailey (1956)). In particular, a question emerged: what should be rate of inflation? 
Inflation  (even perfectly  foreseen by the agents) acts as a liquidity tax. So for Pareto-
optimal resource allocation the inflation rate should minimize this tax. Friedman (1969), 
assuming that the production of money is costless and only lump-sum taxes are levied, 
obtained that the optimal inflation rate (and so the inflation tax) is negative, and equal to 
the real rate of interest taken with minus. That is  money holding is so profitable as 
investment. However this result is not general. The question what conditions provide the 
Friedman rule caused the huge stream of papers, and it does not dry up till the last time, 
see Lucas (2000). I mention only one general result. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1995) 
showed that if consumers have homothetic and separable preferences, and zero initial 
conditions on nominal values of money and bonds the Friedman rule is optimal even in 
the models with distortionary taxes: in particular, in the models with money in utility 
function, in the shopping time- and  cash-in-advance models. In more general conditions 
the relations like «distorted Friedman rule» by S. Тurnovsky (1987, !995, 2000) take 
place,  see also  A. Drazen (1979), С. Chamley (1985). Generally the optimal inflation 
rate can have an arbitrary sign, as we demonstrate it in the paper.  
 The Phelps rule (1973) became an alternative to the Friedman’s one. It required 
that the liquidity service like every source else bring its share of income to the 
government’s budget. The rule relates optimal in Ramsey’s sense  income tax rate  τ and 
the inflation tax rate in the form of nominal interest rate n: 
[∂(τz + nm)/dτ] : z = [∂(τz + nm)/dn]: m = const, 
where z =  income of the representative consumer,  m = real money balances (values of z 
and m  are optimal responses of the consumer given  τ and n), nm – inflation tax (by 
Phelps’ definition). So τz + nm is the total budget revenue, including taxes on income and 
money. The rule states that the marginal revenues from a unit of each kind of receipts 
should be equal. This looks as an «almost obvious» characterization of optimal stationary 
solutions. The Phelps’ result allowed (if not stated) the existence of positive inflation tax,  
opposed to the Friedman rule demanded for a zero inflation tax.  Taken in the static 
framework, the problem was to maximize the indirect utility of the representative 
consumer in τ and n subject to the government budget constraint: τz + nm = const. Phelps 
argued that the sum τz + nm is a subtraction from the consumers’ income and influences 
the consumer’s demand  and  labor supply. Hence, in order for the taxation be non-
distortionary, this sum should be constant: that is, the sum of income effects should 
remain invariant with respect to  changes in policies (τ, n). Here we obtain an analogous 
relation, assuming that the sum of income and expenses effects (including debt payments) 
is equal to zero.  
 The subsequent authors working with dynamic setting did not reproduce the 
Phelps’ result, except probably  the case of special type  utility function, Sotskov (2002). 
We mention two papers. Draizen (1979) considered a model  of Sidrauski- type with a 
number of products the sales of which were taxed. For stationary solutions he obtained a 
relation with Lagrange multipliers and cross elasticities. Chamley (1985) for stationary 
solutions of a Sidrauski-type  model  derived a simple optimal taxation rule:  
ε =ν /(1+ν ), 
where ε  - interest elasticity of demand for real money balances, ν - marginal costs of 
taxation,  ν = µ / q , where q and µ are Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraints of 
the consumer and government, respectively. When lump-sum taxes are available, ν =0  
that implies  ε =0, and so π = - r (Friedman rule); when ν →∞  (the tax burden → ∞)  the 
government maximizes its revenue from the inflation tax. This is an elegant result in 
terms of Lagrangean multipliers.  
I am  going to characterize the optimal stationary solution of Sidrauski- type 
model, and still obtain a rule of the Phelps- type. At some «natural» conditions (it is 
assumed that the rate of time preference is equal to the real world interest rate, and no 
Ponzi game) the model has a stationary solution satisfying the optimality conditions, and 
stationary policies induce stationary equilibrium trajectories. It is supposed also that a part 
of the government policy ensures the jump from  the initial values to the stationary ones. 
In these conditions the  Phelps characterization of the optimal stationary solution remains 
valuable. However, in order to be assured that the policy calculated from t=0 will be 
reproduced further, the subsequent governments (which are supposed to maximize the 
consumer welfare in the dynamic problem) should continue the same policy. Such a 
policy  is called  consistent in time. Inconsistent policies provoke unforeseen agents’ 
behavior, and consequently decrease the efficiency of government control on the 
economy. So the following question naturally comes up: what conditions provide 
existence of consistent in time policy? In fact, we have here not a welfare maximization 
problem for a given government, but a game in extensive form where there is a sequence 
of  changing each other players -governments, and a time consistent policy is a 
subgame perfect solution of the game. The additional requirement of consistency in time 
supplies the necessary foundation for the static Phelps- type characterization of optimal 
stationary policy.  This view is succеssively  put through the paper.  
The first ideas concerning the problem of inconsistency of government monetary 
policy appeared probably in Sargent and Wallace (1973), and note of Calvo (1977). They 
proposed a concept of prices which allowed to study unforeseen deviation in monetary 
and debt policies, and at the same time to attend to the notion of rational expectations 
equilibrium. A price should have the right-side derivative in time and be continuous 
everywhere except the initial moment. At the initial moment jumps  of prices may result 
from unexpected infusion of money (subsidies to students or invalids). Аuernheimer 
(1974)  introduced a concept of «honest» government which did not allow unexpected 
price jumps, and changed the supply of money and debt only by means of purchase or sale 
of bonds or goods at the open market. Here in the model with foreign currency we 
propose an analog of Аuernheimer’s  «honest» government’s commitment. We say more 
in detail about the causes of inconsistency below. 
Typically inconsistency in time emerges in the world of rational expectations and 
distorting taxes. A general setting of the problem with examples was done by Kydland 
and Prescott (1977).  Fisher (1980) gave an example of inconsistent tax policy in a two-
period model. The consumer makes decision depending on the expected values of taxes in 
the second period, and taking it into account the government chooses their optimal values 
for the two periods. However, when the second period comes up the (new) government 
ignores the consumers’ expectation and anew determines taxes for the second period. 
They naturally differ from the expected ones which were calculated for two periods. 
Calvo (1978) considered the causes of inconsistency in a model where the government 
finances the budget by means of money emission. In this case the inconsistency effect 
occurs in the similar way. The real money balances that the consumer wants to have today 
depend on to-morrow prices (the rate of inflation is defined so). The government 
optimizing from today take it into consideration, but when to-morrow comes the new (or 
the same) government optimizes over again taking prices free. The induced equilibrium 
puts no constraint on the initial price (see the mentioned above concept of price). So the 
starting value of real money balances (the base of inflation tax) is also free for the new 
government. The governments’ budget constraint generates trade-off between inflation 
and regular taxes. However any changing a distortionary (say income) tax results in 
distortion of values of consumption, capital, labor, that means deviation from the optimal 
solution calculated by the former government, that is  inconsistency in time. (This trade-
off shows also why the Friedman rule fails in general case).  
The examples given above show that inconsistency in time of a policy is 
associated with lack of the proper commitments of  the new governments before 
predecessors (or themselves). If the governments commit to be «honest» (in the 
Auernheimer’ sense) the starting price is determined by the prehistory, and this ensures 
the consistency of monetary policy in time. When governments are not «honest» the 
requirement the solution be consistent in time ordinarily brings to the Friedman regime 
with zero nominal interest rate, zero income tax rate, and hence to a non-balanced 
government’ budget at positive expenditures. This is the typical answer in the situation 
«without commitments», see  Turnovsky and Brock (1980). Here we also demonstrate it 
in our model. In the opposite case  strict regime of commitments requires «to respect the  
real wealth of consumers and the external debt». Such governments are able to produce 
the optimal and  consistent policy. The corresponding solution is called here general 
stationary solution.  
An additional accent is made in the paper on the role of foreign currency in the 
economy, in particular on its influence on the consumer’s welfare. To this end we put into 
the model of a small open economy foreign currency, which imperfectly substitutes the 
domestic one in transactions. Behind this the high level of dollarization of Russian 
economy stands up for, and as my calculation show the implied consumer’s welfare 
losses. It is supposed that the rate of inflation in foreign currency and the world real rate 
of interest are constant, and the assumptions PPP and UIP are fulfilled. The government 
maximizes the consumer’s welfare choosing the following policy bundle:  income tax 
rate, rate of money emission, level of state expenditure, and also it issues to the open 
market bonds denominated in foreign currency. The optimal consistent in time solution is 
described by a static system of equations. The consistency in time is supported by specific 
(in presence of foreign currency) governments’ commitments. This is a  second-best 
solution. In the  case of the Friedman rule the solution (if it exists) also is not the first-best 
because of the fixed  foreign nominal interest rate. Below I tell about the studying and 
calculations of these solutions. In this part of the paper (Sections1 and 2) the basic results  
were Е. Phelps (1973), S. Turnovsky and W. Brock (1980), S. Turnovsky (1987), S. 
Turnovsky (2000).  
The model considered in Section  1 did not include capital, since the variables 
jumped from the initial data to the stationary ones, and capital could’t do it. In Section 3  I 
consider a stationary growth model with capital which linearly enters the production 
function of type AК-Romer. This model is reduced to one without capital and the similar 
work is done with it.  
A general  Phelps’ type characterization of the optimal stationary and consistent in 
time solutions described in Section 2 and 3 is given in Section  4.  
In Section 5 the theory is added by a calibration of the model based on Russian 
data and calculation of the optimal and equilibrium stationary solutions for different 
values of parameters. For calculations I take a standard  CRRA-utility   function which 
has not satiation in real balances of currencies; so the Friedman rule is excluded. The 
parameters of the model were evaluated on the base of some fundamental proportions, 
which have turned out in Russian economy to the present time. I mean such as  share of 
labor in outcome,  shares in GDP of real government expenditure,  of internal and 
external debt, of consumption, the rate of the associated tax,  the real money balances / 
consumption, and the level of dollarization. According to the last data the dollar to ruble 
balances ratio is equal approximately 6:5 that seems unjustified at the inflation rate less 
15% per year.  Why people keep so much foreign liquidity at such level of inflation is out 
of the framework of the model (probably they have not much confidence to the 
government). Here the high level of dollarization is considered as forced upon: we look 
for the solutions at which the proportion 6:5 or close takes place.  
The calculations showed that the optimal, stationary, and time consistent solution 
with close to the real Russian economic data is very sensitive to the critical parameter of 
currency substitution. The stable results were observed at values close to zero, less than 
0.01. (For comparison, Imrohoroglu (1994), taking Canada as the small economy and the 
United States as the rest of the world, obtains elasticity of substitution of US dollar to 
canadian one about 0,3). Thus the model requires very weak substitution  dollars to rubles 
at the optimal consistent solution (at least if the currencies are called up only to reduce 
transaction costs through the utility function). Note that ordinarily in the literature (except 
Imrohoroglu (1994)) the empirical evaluating of currency substitution gives essentially 
bigger value, more than 1, see Seljuk (2003). Taking it I studied further equilibrium  
solutions which exist at the bigger value of the parameter.  
The main part of the calculations concerned the equilibrium (not optimal) 
solutions. Equilibrium solutions close to the real data (they appeared to be stable with 
respect to changing the parameters) show the welfare losses from dollarization. 
Comparing the welfare values for the present level of dollarization and zero level I find 
the percent of welfare losses. The negative effect of dollarization is confirmed also in 
Fridman and  Verbetsky (2001), where they say about negative effect of dollarization at 
not high inflation. Besides that, I studied  how different parameters influence the 
equilibrium states of the model. 
1. Perfect foresight equilibrium and optimal government policy in a 
model with foreign currency 
1.1 Structure of economy. We describe the basic model on which the optimality 
and consistency questions are studied. This is a model of a small open economy in perfect 
foresight equilibrium as it was given in S. Turnovsky (1987) where a foreign currency 
additionally enters and imperfectly substitutes the domestic currency. The economy 
produces a single traded good, the foreign price of which Q is fixed on the world market. 
There are three sectors: consumers, firms, and domestic government (fiscal-monetary 
authority). The consumers and firms are assumed to be identical, so we speak about a 
representative consumer and a firm. The representative consumer solves the following 
optimization problem:  
max 
t =
∞∑
0
 (1+ρ)-t U(Ct , Mt /Pt , Ft /Qt, lt, Gt) 
subject to: 
Mt+1 + Ft+1Et + Bt+1Et = Mt + FtEt + (1-τt)(wt lt+ Πt)+ Et(1+nFt)Bt  - PtCt , 
and initial conditions:  M0 >0, F0 >0, B0 >0, P0, E0.   
We denote here Ct - private real consumption, Mt, Ft - nominal money balances in 
domestic and foreign currencies, Gt - real government expenditure, Pt  - domestic price 
level, lt - labor, wt - nominal wage rate, Πt - nominal profit, τt - income tax rate, Et - 
exchange rate (ruble/ $),  ρ - rate of time preference; Bt+1 - nominal stock of one-period 
traded bonds; denominated in foreign currency, bought in period t, nFt - foreign nominal 
interest rate. We assume that the cost of change of the currencies is equal zero. Also for 
simplicity, we assume that interest income is untaxed. In determining the optimal plan for 
Сt, Mt, lt, Bt, Ft , the consumer takes parameters   τt, Gt, Πt, wt, , nFt, Pt, Qt, Et, ρ as given 
for all  t=0,1,...  
Denote M =M/P и F =F/Q. One-period utility function  U(C, M , F , l, G) is 
assumed to be concave and twice differentiable in its five arguments, with positive 
marginal utility in C, M , F , G and negative one in l. Since the consumer produces  
demand in real terms, it is convenient to set his problem in real terms also: 
max 
t=
∞∑
0
(1+ρ)-t U(Ct , Mt , Ft , lt, Gt)                                          (1)  
subject to:                                                                            
(1+πt+1) Mt +1 +(1+qt+1)( Ft +1 + Bt +1)= Mt + Ft +(1-τt)( w t lt+ Π t )+(1+nFt) Bt - Ct       (2)                                      
and initial conditions: M0 =M0 /P0 , F0 = F0 / Q0  and B0 = B0/Q0 .  
Here πt+1 = (Pt+1 - Pt)/Pt - rate of inflation of good in domestic currency, qt -  rate 
of inflation of good in foreign currency, w  = wt /Pt, Π t = Πt /Pt , Bt =Bt/Qt. By definition 
1+nt = (1+rt)(1+πt), or approximately  nt = rt+πt, where rt  - is real world interest rate, 
analogously nFt = qt+rt. In real terms we have got a new regulator πt instead of P. Since 
the initial prices P0 и Q0  are given, and values M0 , B0 и F0 are in «his hands», then the 
real values M0 , B0 , F0  are determined. The values B0 and F0  are predetermined by the 
past accumulation, while M0  is determined   by the equilibrium price  P0 , and 
consequently is endogenous. Sum M0  + B0  + F0  is the real financial wealth of the 
consumer at the moment t=0. 
The second sector is production. Firms for producing output hire labor and 
maximize real profit Π t = f(lt) - w t lt , where w t  is real wage rate, f(l) is the production 
function, assumed to possess the usual property of positive  but diminishing  marginal 
product of labor.  
The third sector is government. It is assumed to control the income tax rate τt, the 
rate of money emission θt+1 =(Mt+1 - Mt)/Mt , government expenditures Gt , and  issues 
bonds which are bought and sold on the open market for foreign currency by residents as 
well as foreigners. We denote the stock of the government ‘s debt  by At, At =At/Qt, is real 
debt.   The government problem consists in keeping the state budget: 
τtf(lt) + Mt θt+1 + q( Ft +1 + Bt +1  - Ft - Bt ) - Gt = (1+r) At - At +1 . 
The resource balance of the economy can be presented as an accumulation  law of 
the foreign assets. Denote the external government debt by Dt = At  - Bt , the stock of 
«disposable» foreign assets by Rt = Ft - Dt , and the real world interest rate by rt . Then the 
resource balance takes the form: 
 Rt +1  - Rt = rt Rt + f(lt) - Ct - Gt - (rt + qt) Ft .                        (3) 
Since there is only a single traded good and the economy is perfectly open the PPP 
property holds, i.e. P=QE that implies after differentiation that π = q+ e, where e is rate 
of exchange depreciation. Adding to the both parts real interest r we have got another so 
called UIP relation: n = nF + e. Later on we set q and r fixed, constant in time, and q > - 
r. Thus the nominal interest rate n и the rate of depreciation e are determined by the 
inflation rate: n = π + r, e = π - q. 
1.2 Perfect foresight equilibrium. A bundle of policy instruments (τt, θt, At,  Gt) 
for all t from 0 till ∞, subject to the balance constraint (i.e. three of four are independent) 
is called policy. It is assumed that a declared government policy is implemented further in 
life. From the other side the consumer possesses the perfect foresight w.r.t. the 
equilibrium parameters corresponding to the declared policy. We introduce the 
equilibrium notion. Given a policy (τt, θt, At,, Gt) parameters (πt , nt, et, Π t , w t )  are called 
perfect foresight equilibrium if the planned demand and supply functions (Ct, Mt , Ft , Bt , 
lt), t=0,1,..., solve the consumer ((1),(2)) and the producer problems and satisfy the 
resource balance (3)  
We now proceed to develop the conditions for a perfect foresight equilibrium. The 
first order conditions for the consumer variables Сt , Mt , Ft , lt, Bt    have the standard 
form. They are included in the equilibrium relations below. The transversality conditions 
for Mt , Ft , Bt  are : 
lim  λt Mt (1+ρ)-t = 0,  lim  λt Bt (1+ρ)-t = 0, lim  λt Ft (1+ρ)-t = 0  при t→ ∞ .       (T) 
The equilibrium conditions for the representative firm are the usual marginal 
product condition w t  = f’(lt) and the definition of profit: Π t = f(lt) - w t lt . 
 The government choice of a rate of printing money θt+1 =(Mt+1 - Mt)/Mt  gives in 
real terms the equality: (1+πt+1) Mt +1  = Mt (1+θt+1 ).   Now the perfect foresight 
equilibrium can be specified as follows: 
UC(t) = λt ,                                                    (4a) 
UM (t) = λt (r + πt) ,                                       (4b)                   
UF (t) = λt (r + q) ,                                         (4c)                            
Ul (t) = - λt (1-τt) f’(lt) ,                                  (4d)                              
λt =  λt-1 (1+ρ)/(1+r),                                    (4e)                              
(1+πt+1) Mt +1  = Mt (1+θt+1 ),                           (4f) 
Mt θt+1 + (1+q)( Ft +1 + Bt +1)+ Ct = Ft +(1-τt)f(l)+(1+q+r) Bt ,                 (4g) 
Rt +1  - Rt = rt Rt + f(lt) - Ct - Gt - (r + q) Ft ,                        (4h) 
where Rt = Ft + Bt - At , initial conditions M0 , F0 , B0 , and transvesality conditions (T). 
Here M0 =M0 /P0 , where equilibrium price P0 =Q0Е0, so one can say that M0  is 
determined by the equilibrium rate of exchange Е0 at t=0 (which, note it, does not enter 
the equilibrium conditions).  
We have got a dynamic system of 8 equations (4a)-(4h) with 7 variables Сt , Mt , 
Ft , lt, Bt , λt , πt and one of policy instruments τt, θt, At,  Gt , which solves at given initial 
data B0 , F0 . The choice of a policy instrument for supporting equilibrium S. Turnovsky 
calls accommodation. We shall choose for accommodation in Calculations (Section 5) the 
rate of money emission θ.  
Obviously, a stationary solution is possible only if r≡ρ and θ =π.  If we exclude 
the regimes where Uc and UF  converge to 0 or ∞ then r can not be strictly more or less 
than ρ .  
1.3 Optimal government policies. We shall call a bundle of policy instruments 
(τt, θt, At,, Gt)  a united policy. Let the government seeks to determine  the united policy 
which maximizes the welfare function of the representative consumer (1) subject to the 
equilibrium constraints (4). The problem has the form:  
max 
t =
∞∑
0
(1+ρ)-t U(- Rt +1+(1+r) Rt  + f(lt) - Gt - (r + q) Ft ; Mt ; Ft ; Gt; lt)          (5) 
subject to: 
UC (t) = λt ,                                                       (5a) 
U’l (t) = - λt (1-τt)f’(lt) ,                                      (5b)    
U’M (t) = λt(r + πt),                                             (5c) 
UF (t) = λt (r + q) ,                                              (5d) 
          τtf(lt) + Mt θt+1 + q( Ft +1 + Bt +1  - Ft - Bt ) - Gt = (1+r) At - At +1 ,          (5e) 
Mt +1  = Mt (1+θt+1 )/(1+πt+1),                                      (5f) 
λt =  λt-1 (1+ρ)/(1+r).                                            (5g)  
The intertemporal welfare function (5) is maximized on policy parameters τt, θt, At, Gt , 
and variables of the model l, Mt , Ft , Bt , πt, λt,. The solution of the problem  must 
satisfy also the transversality conditions (T). The initial values are: A0 , B0 , F0 , M0 , λ0 . 
We  say more exactly about them below. 
The Lagrangian expression is: 
Lt = (1+ρ)-tU(- Rt +1+(1+r) Rt  + f(lt) - Gt - (r + q) Ft ; Mt ; Ft ; Gt; lt)+ν1(1+ρ)-t[λt -Uc] - 
ν2(1+ρ)-t[(1-τt)f’(lt)λt+ Ul]+ ν3(1+ρ)-t[(r+πt)λt -UM]+ ν4(1+ρ)-t[λt (r+q) -UF] - s1(1+ρ)-
t[τt f(lt) + Mt θt+1 + q( Ft +1 + Bt +1) - q( Ft + Bt ) - Gt - (1+r) At + At +1 ] +      s2(1+ρ)-t 
⋅[ Mt (1+θt+1) -(1+πt+1) Mt +1 ] + s3(1+ρ)-t[(1+ρ)λt -(1+r) λt+1] . 
The first order conditions w.r.t. unknown variables τt, Gt, θt, At , l, Mt , Bt , πt, λt, Ft   
have the form (index of moment  t is omitted): 
ν2 f’(l)λt - s1 f(l) = 0,                                        (6a)                              
[UC - ν1UCC -ν2 UlC -ν3 UMC -ν4UFC] -[UG -ν1UCG -ν2 UlG -ν3 UMG -ν4UFG]- s1 = 0,  (6b) 
s1 - s2 = 0,                                                   (6c) 
     (1+r)[-UC+ν1UCC+ν2 UlC+ν3 UMC +ν4UFC+ s1] - (1+ρ)[-UC(t-1)+            (6d) 
 ν1(t-1)UCC(t-1)+ ν2 (t-1)UlC (t-1) + ν3(t-1)UMC (t-1) +ν4(t-1)UFC (t-1)+ s1(t-1)] = 0 ;                              
              [UC fl + Ul] - ν1 [UCC fl + UСl] -ν2 [UlC fl + Ull + fllUC(1-τt)] -                    (6e)                                 
ν3 [UMC fl + UMl]- ν4 [UFC fl + UFl] - s1τt fl  = 0,                          
UM -ν1UCM -ν2 UlM -ν3UMM -ν4UFM  - s1θt+1+ s2(1+θt+1) - s2(t -1)(1+ρ)(1+πt) = 0,  (6f) 
(1+r)[-UC+ν1UCC+ν2 UlC+ν3 UMC +ν4 UFC - s1 q] - (1+ρ)[-UC(t-1)+               (6g) 
ν1(t-1)UCC(t-1)+ ν2 (t-1)UlC (t-1) + ν3(t-1)UMC (t-1)+ ν4 (t-1)UFC(t-1) - s1(t-1)q] = 0 ;                              
ν3λt  - s2(t-1)(1+ρ) Mt = 0,                                      (6h) 
ν1 - ν2 (1-τt)fl + ν3 (r+πt) +ν4(r+q)+ s3(t)(1+ρ) - s3(t-1)(1+ρ)(1+r) = 0,           (6i) 
(1+r)[-UC+ν1UCC+ν2 UlC+ν3 UMC +ν4 UFC -s1 q]-(1+ρ)[-UC(t-1)+ν1(t-1)UCC(t-1)   (6j) 
+ν2 (t-1)UlC (t-1) + ν3(t-1)UMC (t-1)+ ν4 (t-1)UFC(t-1) - s1(t-1)q]+[UC(r+q) - UF] -  
ν1[UCC(q+r) -UCF] -ν2[UlC(q+r) -UlF] -ν3[UMC(q+r) -UMF]- ν4[UFC(q+r) -UFF] = 0.  
The transversality conditions should hold  at infinity: s1 Bt (1+ρ)-t→ 0, s1 Ft (1+ρ)-
t→ 0, s1 At (1+ρ)-t→ 0, s2(t) Mt (1+ρ)-t→ 0,  s3(t)λ(t)(1+ρ)-t→ 0  at t→∞ ;  besides, the 
transversality conditions from the consumer problem: 
lim  λt Mt (1+ρ)-t = 0,  lim  λt Bt (1+ρ)-t = 0, lim  λt Ft (1+ρ)-t = 0  при t→ ∞ .       (T) 
These are the necessary conditions of optimality of the united policy.  
 Further everywhere the following assumption holds: 
 the rate of time preference is equal to the real world interest: 
ρ =r. 
This condition seems to be acceptable for a small open economy. There takes place the 
following  
Proposition 1. If  ρ =r and all no Ponzi game and transversality conditions hold 
the first order conditions for the problem  (5)  determine the stationary solution which 
satisfies the static system of equations (6’),(5a)-(5d),(4’g),(4’h). 
Really, if ρ =r, then (6d) and (6g) imply equality s1(t) = s1(t-1), that is s1(t)=const; 
then (6с) gives s2 = s1 = const; equation (5g) is transformed in  λ =const and so s3 = 0. 
Taking all this into account and using (5)a-(5d), we reduce system (6) to the following 
form (index t is omitted): 
ν2 fl (l)λ - s1 f(l) = 0,                                             (6’a) 
UC  - ν1UCC -ν2UlC - ν3UMC - ν3UMC -ν4 UFC =µ.                               (6’b) 
           UG  - ν1UCG -ν2UlG - ν3UMG - ν3UMG  - ν4 UFG =µ - s1,                             (6’c) 
              [UC fl + Ul] - ν1 [UCC fl + UСl] -ν2 [UlC fl + Ull + fllUC(1-τ)] -                 (6’d)                                 
-ν3 [UMC fl + UMl]- ν4 [UFC fl + UFl] - s1τ fl  = 0,                          
UM  - ν1UCM  -ν2UlM - ν3UMM - ν4 UFM = 0,                              (6’e) 
ν3 λ  - s1 (1+ρ) M = 0,                                      (6’f) 
ν1 - ν2 (1-τ)fl + ν3 (r+π) +ν4(r+q) = 0,                             (6’g) 
ν1[UCC(q+r) -UCF]+ ν2[UlC(q+r) - UlF]+ ν3[UMC(q+r) - UMF] + 
+ν4[UFC(q+r) - UFF] = 0.                                     (6’h) 
This is a static system of 8 equations. One can add to it 4 static constraints (5a)-(5d) and 
to solve the obtained system for  12 variables С, G, l, M , F , π, τ, ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4 , µ  in 
terms of constants  λ and s1. This means that policy π, τ, G and variables С, G, l, M , F , 
ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4  are in fact stationary. Since M is actually constant,  (5f) implies that θ =π = 
const. 
The equilibrium solution has to satisfy also two balance constraints (4g) and (4h). 
We rewrite them in the form: 
 (1 + q)( Bt +1  - Bt ) = r Bt  + [(1-τ)f(l) - C - π M - q F ],                  
( Bt +1- At +1 ) - (1+r)( Bt - At ) =  f(l) - C - G - q F .                 
If we develop these relations to moment t=0 and use the no Ponzi game conditions, 
(which in this case coincide with the transversality conditions) for Bt  and At , then we get 
one more two static relations: 
r( B + F + M )+ (1-τ)f(l) - С - (θ+r) M - (q+r) F = 0,                (4’g)                   
f(l) - C - G - q F  - r( A - B ) = 0.                                (4’h)        
Let us choose constants λ and s1  so that the both balances hold. At that one can count that 
A - B = A0 - B0 . The initial values A0  and B0 , as well as F0  and M0 , have to be changed 
by the government as it is described below in points 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.  Thus we determine  
the optimal stationary values of all variables in system (6a), (5a)-(5d), (4’g), (4’h). • 
We call such a solution general stationary solution. In order to follow the 
stationary solution the initial values B0 , F0  and M0  should change to the equilibrium 
values B , F , M at moment t=0. This change requires a certain activity from the 
government at the bond market. This is a part of government’s policy. We consider two 
variants of such actions.  
1.3.1 We determine the stationary value of the bond stock B from equality: 
B + F = B0 + F0 . The jump from B0 , F0  to B , F  results from the intervention of the 
government at the (internal) bond market. In order to answer the consumer’s demand  
(remind that bonds are denominated in foreign currency) the government changes   the 
initial stock of issued bonds A0  so that the equality A - A0  = B - B0  holds. The external 
debt A0 - B0  =W1  remains invariable.  The real money balances M0  changes to M  by 
means of jump of  rate of exchange E(0).  
 1.3.2. We determine the stationary value of real stock of bonds B  from equality 
F + B + M =W0 , where W0  is the initial real  consumer’s wealth. Here it is supposed that 
the consumer purchasing or selling bonds, uses foreign currency and domestic one; the 
latter changes on the given exchange rate E0. In this way the consumer gets stationary 
values F , M . The stock of issued bonds changes as in point 1.3.1: A - A0  = B - B0 . In 
this case the initial exchange rate E0 and price P0 are taken from prehistory, just nominal 
values jump from F0, M0, B0 to F, M, B so that B - B0 = A - A0  and F - F0 + (M-M0)/E0 + 
B - B0 =0. Further Mt and Et (as well as price Pt) grow with rate θ. 
The jump of variables described in p. 1.3.2 is obtained in  maximization problem 
(5) with new initial data  B + F + M = W0 , A - B =W1 .  The first order conditions (6)  
are  reduced to static system (6’) in the same way as before. The new transversality 
condition at the left end: s1(0) = s2(0) agrees with condition (6с), the first member in (4’g) 
is equal rW0 , the last member in (4’h) is equal rW1 , and constants λ and s1 are chosen for 
(4’g),(4’h) just with these conditions.  
In the next Section we produce an additional to optimality requirement of 
consistency in time of the government’s policy.  
2. The problem of consistency in time  
The optimal stationary (second best) solution calculated from the moment t=0 can 
be, generally speaking, improved for the consumer by a new policy starting at moment 
t>0; that results in deviation from the optimal trajectory. This occurs if the following 
governments do not commit themselves to support the continuous changing of the state 
coordinates of the system (in particular, real money balances and bonds). They say in this 
case that the government’s policy or solution is time inconsistent. The assertion that 
contradicts at the first sight the principle of dynamic programming, turns out true when 
unexpected changing of policy (which hence do not justify the  agents’ expectations on 
which they based their decisions) deviate the real variables of the model. In our model the 
source of inconsistency is the monetary policy. The expectations of growth or fall of 
prices determine the expected rate of inflation between current t and t+1 periods, and the 
current demand on real money balances depends on  this rate of inflation. The government 
that starts at moment t+1, and does not commit to follow the expected plan considers 
starting data in real money balances as free, but not given from the prehistory. If lump-
sum taxes are not available there is a trade-off between distortionary taxes and inflation 
tax the base of which is real money balances. The decreasing of the distortionary taxes is 
possible at the expense of increasing of money base, that results in increasing the rate of 
inflation. In principle such operation can improve the consumer’s welfare but this means 
that the original policy is inconsistent in time. Consistent policy destimulates the 
following governments to undertake unexpected deviations from before chosen policy. 
The transversality conditions at each start  holding along the consistent solution make 
unprofitable (in the first order) any deviations. (The dual variables corresponding to free 
state coordinates become equal to zero). However this scenario concerning the 
governments «without commitments» brings ordinarily the Friedman regime with income 
tax τ = 0, and so unbalanced for a government - debtor. Below in p. 2.1-2.3 we consider 
several variants of governments’ commitments and their consequences for the 
inconsistency problem. 
2.1 «Full commitments». The government starting at any moment t≥ 0  
commits to take the accumulated from the past values Bt , Ft , Mt , At  as given initial 
data.  
In this case the optimal policy and the corresponding  solution with given at  t=0 
initial conditions will be consistent in time. (In case of continuous time we would require 
that the governments commit to support the continuous change of the state coordinates).  
2.2 «Without commitment to inherit the real money balances». The 
governments optimizing policy from moments t≥ 0 take values At , Bt , Ft  given from the 
past, and Mt  as free.  
Let us consider the consequences of such behavior. In this case free coordinate 
Mt  gives the transversality condition  s2(t)=0; then (6h) implies ν3=0, and (6c)  s1(t)≡ 0, 
(6a) gives ν2 =0; besides that λt =λ=const,  s3=0. Taking all this into account systems (6) 
and  (6’) reduce to five static equations: 
UC  - ν1UCC  - ν4 UFC = UG  - ν1UCG  - ν4 UFG.                               (7a) 
 (UC  - ν1UCC  - ν4 UFC) fl + (Ul  - ν1UCl  - ν4 UFl) = 0,                     (7b) 
UM  - ν1UCM  - ν4 UFM = 0,                                         (7c) 
ν1[UCC(q+r) -UCF] - ν4[UFC(q+r) -UFF] = 0.                           (7d) 
ν1  + ν4 (r + q) = 0,                                             (7e) 
Rewrite it in a more convenient form excluding ν1, and introducing the notation:   
ω = UF  - UC (q+r). 
(Function ω (C , M , F , l, G) is equal zero on the equilibrium states by force of  (4с), but 
its private derivatives are generally non-zero). Using (5a)-(5d) we get: 
UC - UG =  ν4(ωC  - ωG),                                           (7’a) 
τ fl UC = ν4 (ωC fl + ω l),                                        (7’b) 
(π + r)UC = ν4 ωM ,                                                     (7’c) 
0 = ν4[ωF - ωC(q+r)].                                      (7’d) 
Now the question is whether ν4 is equal zero or not. If the consumer preference is satiated 
on real money balances then the equality ν4 = 0 becomes possible and gives the Friedman 
rule with τ = 0, π = - r, UC = UG . However this regime provides no income to the 
government’s budget 
τf(l) + θ M  = G + r A . 
If  the government is a debtor such a regime is actually not possible, and so is time-
inconsistent.  
Let us consider the case  of non-satiated consumer’s preferences when  UM 
nowhere is zero. Suppose that the solution exists. Then (5c), (7’c), and (7’d) ) imply that 
ν4 ≠ 0 and ωF = ωC(q+r).  After substitution the expressions for  ωF and ωC  (7’d) takes 
the form: 
2UCF(q+r) = UFF + UCC(q+r)2.                                 (7’’d) 
Since q + r > 0 and U is a convex function the inequality UCF < 0 holds at the optimal 
point, that is the marginal utility of consumption, or the same the marginal utility of the 
accumulated assets for the private sector decreases when the foreign money balances 
increase. This is true if the solution with ν4 ≠ 0 exists. However in a the particular case of 
a standard utility function of CRRA type considered in Section 5, system (7’) has as 
solution only Friedman regime. 
Remark. If the model does not contain foreign currency systems (5) and (7)  give 
Friedman regime with UM =0, π =θ = - r,   τ =0; hence the government budget constraint 
can not be fulfilled given positive right side.  
2.3 «Respect the accumulated consumer’s wealth and the external debt» (a 
commitment of «honest» government). We assume that the government starting at t≥ 0 
pledge oneself to respect the accumulated real consumer’s wealth Wt , and the external 
debt  At - Bt ; in other words, it takes as initial constraints: B + F + M =Wt  (one can put 
here the inequality ≥ 0) and  A - B = At - Bt . 
In this case the time-consistent optimal policy coincides with the general 
stationary solution of system (6’), (5a)-(5d), (4’g),(4’g). The jump to the stationary values 
at t=0 is produced by the open market operations as it was described in p.1.3.2. The 
following governments find the same general stationary solution.  
Marginal effects of small policy deviations from the stationary values can be 
evaluated with the help of shadow prices in Lagrangian for the dynamic problem. System 
(6’) shows that all  (direct and indirect) marginal welfare effects should be zero, and this 
makes unprofitable any deviations for the first government , and with commitments of 
p.2.3 for the following.  
So far we  did not include capital in the model. All the state variables allowed in 
principle jump to the stationary values, while capital can’t do it. In the next Section we 
consider a growth model with capital where one can obtain the analogous results. 
3. A model of stationary growth 
Suppose that the basic (previous) model admits the endogenous growth of 
technical progress type. Basing on the previous results we consider dependence of 
stationary regimes on constant in time government policies and obtain at the end the 
Phelps characterization for the optimal regime.  
3.1 Description of the model.  The model is essentially the same. The 
representative consumer solves the problem:  
max 
t =
∞∑
0
(1+ρ)-t U(Ct , Mt /Pt , Ft /Qt,, Gt, lt) 
subject to  
Mt+1 + Ft+1Et + Bt+1Et = Mt+ FtEt + (1-τt)(Wt lt + Πt + St Kt)+ Et(1+nF)Bt -PtCt -Pt It+1, 
Kt+1 = Kt(1-δ)+ It+1 , 
and initial conditions  K0 >0, M0>0, F0 >0, B0 >0, P0 and E0.   
We use the same notations as before, and: K - capital, St  - nominal interest rate on capital, 
It – capital investment, δ - rate of depreciation,. 
In order for the properties of the model were compatible with growth we assume 
that one-period utility function U(C, M/P, F/Q, G; l) is homogenous of (1-σ) − degree in 
the first four arguments  (C, M/P, F/Q, G), convex and twice continuously differentiable 
in all arguments.  
For production process we imposed Romer’s (1986) AK-function. See also 
Turnovsky (1995,  ch. 13), or Turnovsky (2000). The productive sector of the economy is 
presented by N identical firms, each endowed by K units of capital and the maximal labor 
supply is limited by one unit of time. The accumulated capital k = NK is also a measure of 
the stock of knowledge in the economy; the knowledge is assumed to be non-rival good, 
having the productive value. Since, in this competitive setting, every firm is small, it takes 
k as given. It is convenient to assume that the productive capacity function is of the Cobb-
Douglas form, i.e., the potential output is y = F(K, k)= Kε k1-ε  = N1-εK.  Thus, we come to 
the  Romer AK-model, where A= N1-ε . Since we allow for elastic labor supply, l , the real 
output of each firm is given by f(l)y. Hence, the production function is represented by:  
F(K, l) = AKf(l).  
Now denoting by γt+1 = It+1 /Kt  - δ, we come to the following basic relation  
yt+1 = yt (1+ γt+1) ;   
γt+1  is the growth rate of potential output in the period t+1. The own capital of the firm 
enters the production function as Kε. The economy capital is denoted for a while as K1. 
The firm maximizes the net profits in each period, choosing the optimal values of Kt , lt :  
max [pt AKtε ε−11tK  f(lt ) - Wtlt - StKt] =  Πt  with pt , A ε−11tK , Wt , St given.  
 (Note that if we set f(l) =l1-ε the production function would be of Cobb-Douglas form on 
the own capital and labor). 
Government is the same as in the previous Section, the same policy (τt, θt, Gt, At) 
and external debt At - Bt.  
Because of homogeneity, we can rewrite the consumer’s problem in terms of 
variables relative to the full output: 
max∑∞
=0t
βt ⋅U(ct , mt ,mt*, gt ; lt)                                                               (9) 
subject to: 
        (1+µt+1)mt+1 + mt+1*(1+q)(1+ γt+1)+ bt+1(1+q)(1+ γt+1)= mt+ mt* +     (9a)               
(1-τt)(wtlt+ profit + st Nε-1) + (1+q)(1+r)bt - ct -i(γt+1), 
 with initial condition m0, m0*, b0 > 0 . Notations are:  
βt = Π
s
t
=1 (1+γs)1-σ/(1+ρ)t, 1+µt = (1+γt)(1+πt), where  πt+1=(Pt+1 - Pt)/Pt , mt = Mt /(Ptyt), 
mt* =Ft /(Ptyt), bt = Bt /(Ptyt),  wt  = Wt /(Ptyt),  profit = Πt/Ptyt , st=St /Pt , ct = Ct /yt , gt =  
Gt /yt , i(γt+1) = (γt+1 +δ)Nε -1. . As before we assume rate of inflation in foreign currency q 
and real interest r given and constant. Unknown variables are (ct, mt, lt, bt, γt), values πt , 
profitt, τt, wt , st, gt рассматриваются потребителем как заданные.  
Given interest rate st and real wage wt profit maximization problem determines the 
demand for labor and capital by firms, : 
wt = f’(lt),   st = ε N1-ε f(lt). 
 The choice of rate of money emission by the government θt+1 =(Mt+1 - Mt)/Mt  
gives in relative real terms the relation: 
mt+1 = mt (1+θt+1 )/(1+µt+1). 
 The first order condition for the consumer take the form: 
Uc’ (c , m , m*, g ; l) = λ ,                                      (10а)         
        U’m (c , m , m*, g ; l) =  λ (π + r),                          (10b)                             
U’m* (c , m , m*, g ; l) =  λ(q + r),                           (10c)                       
U’l (c , m, m*, g ; l) = - λ (1-τ)f’(l),                         (10d)                      
where λt  is discounted (on βt)  Lagrangian multiplier in problem (9), (9a). 
3.2 Stationary solution for the consumer problem  In Section 2 we proved  
the stationarity of optimal policy in perfect foresight equilibrium model. We shall base on 
this result here counting that τt ≡ const, gt ≡ const,   θt ≡ const. Let c(λ,τ,π,g), m(λ,τ,π,g), 
m*(λ,τ,π,g), l(λ,τ,π,g) - implicit differentiable functions solving system (10a)-(10d) for c, 
m, m*, l in terms of constants λ,τ,π,g. We can derive the following facts:  
# Equality λt =const  gives by force of  the first order conditions (in dynamic) the 
relation: 1+r = (1+ρ)(1+γt)σ, or approximately: 
r =ρ + σγ , 
i.e. optimal rate of growth γ can be determined immediately given parameters r,ρ, σ and 
so becomes itself as a parameter. (cf. R. Lucas (2000), where real interest was introduced 
so by definition given rate of growth γ). 
## Equalities θt ≡ const ,  mt ≡ const and mt+1 = mt (1+θt+1 )/(1+µt+1)  give:  
θ =µ =const. 
### Given θ and γ one can calculate rate of inflation  π from equality 1+θ 
=(1+γ)(1+π), it is equal approximately: 
π  =θ  - γ. 
#### Discount βt  in problem (9), (9a) at stationary growth is equal:  
β =(1+γ)1-σ/(1+ρ), or approximately: 
β = (1+γ)/(1+ r). 
In a more habitual form the relation between  r, rate of time preference β  and γ  has the 
form: (1/β ) - 1 =  r -γ. Such a relation is necessary for existence of stationary growth.  
(Before we had γ = 0, and r =ρ) . 
We show now that bt remains constant when policy τ, g, θ, rate of inflation π, rate 
of growth  γ  and variables c, m, m*, l, λ stay constant. We substitute the expressions c, m, 
m*, l  through τ, π =θ -γ, g to budget equality of the consumer (9a) taking into account 
optimality of production. Denote: 
∆b = (1-τ)f(l) - c - θ m - (q+γ)m* - i(γ). 
Then we can rewrite it as: 
  ∆b =(1+q)(1+γ)bt+1  - (1+q)(1+r)bt .  
Here ∆b is constant in t. We consider the equation:   
bt+1 = (1+r)bt /(1+γ) + ∆b /(1+q)(1+γ).  
The transversality condition on bt , considering β =(1+γ)/(1+r) (####), takes the form:    
λbt (1+γ)t/(1+r)t →  0 при t → ∞. 
Here (1+γ)/(1+r)<1 (see below). As to  mt =const , the transversality condition holds. 
Developing the equation from t =0, and applying the transversality condition we get:       
∆b = b0 (γ - r). The point bt ≡ b0 is the unique stationary point of the equation.  
Now we can rewrite the budget equality of the consumer in the form: 
                (b0 +m+m*) (r -γ) + (1-τ)f(l)  -  (π+r) m - (q+r)m* - c - i(γ)  = 0.                             
Here c, m, m*, l  are functions of λ,τ,π, g. The last relation allow to exclude λ and to get  
functions:  с(τ, θ, g),  m(τ, θ, g), m*(τ,θ, g), l(τ,θ, g) (further we shall write  θ  instead of 
π, remembering that π  =θ  - γ and  γ is a parameter).  
  Above we used inequality r -γ > 0. Really this is true. The maximization problem 
(9), which is equivalent to the original consumer problem has a solution if discount 
(1+γ)1-σ/(1+ρ) less than 1. This implies: (1+γ)/(1+r) < 1 whence γ < r.  
3.3 Stationary equilibrium growth.  We assume the government declares and 
then pursues a constant policy τ, g, θ. The definition of a perfect foresight equilibrium is 
analogous to that given in Section 1. The resource balance (in relative terms) has the 
form:                              
c + i(γ) + g + (q+γ)m* - f(l) = (1+q)(1+γ)dt+1  - (1+q)(1+r)dt , 
where dt = at - bt  is relative external government debt. 
Denote the left side of the balance by ∆d, thus ∆d = (1+q)(1+γ)dt+1 - (1+q)(1+r)dt is  
relative payment on the external debt in period t which in fact constant in time. We 
require that the no Ponzi game condition hold:  
dt(1+γ)t/(1+r)t  → 0  when t → ∞ . 
In the same way as we did before with the internal debt one can get the final relation: ∆d 
= - d0 (r - γ) and the unique stationary point dt ≡ d0 . So we can write the stationary 
resource balance in the form: 
 c + i(γ) + g + (q+γ)m* + d0 (r - γ) = f(l).                                          
If  initial external debt d0 = a0 - b0  is positive (the country is a debtor), and  γ < r , we 
have d0 (r - γ)>0.  
 The government’s problem is not constrained by choosing a policy (τ, g, θ) and a. 
As before initial values b0, m0, m*0 and a0 accumulated from the past generally do not 
coincide with equilibrium values b, m, m* and a. So the same intervention at the open 
market is needed in order to reorganize the initial conditions. This results in relations: b+ 
m+ m* = b0 + m0+ m0* and  a - b = a0 - b0 = d0 . The reasons given in Section 1 are 
entirely  suitable here.  
 We summarize the all obtained relations in the system of equations the 
equilibrium stationary growth corresponding to a given constant policy τ, g, θ must 
satisfy : 
Uc’ (c , m , g ; l) = λ ,                                                (11a) 
U’m (c , m , g ; l) =  λ (θ + r -γ),                                (11b) 
U’m* (c , m , m*, g ; l) =  λ(q + r),                              (11c) 
U’l (c , m , g ; l) = - λ (1-τ)f’(l),                                   (11d) 
(b+m+m*) (r -γ) + (1-τ)f(l)  -  (θ+r) m - (q+r)m* - c - i(γ)  = 0.           (11e) 
c + i(γ) + g + (q+γ)m* -  f(l)+ d0 (r - γ) = 0.                            (11f)               
Here there are 6 static equations which may be solved for c, m, m*, l, λ and one of 
the control instrument τ, g, θ (if  b0 and d0 are fixed), or one of b0 , d0  if the government is 
capable to change them. In general case the original values b0, m0, m*0 , a0  do not 
coincide with with the equilibrium b, m, m* and a. So as before at t=0 the government 
intervenes at the bond market. The fact that these values are shares of the full outcome 
does not abolish the argumentation given in Section 2.  
For this model I do not derive the relations for the optimal time-consistent policy. 
They have the analogous form. In the next Section I give the Phelps’ type  
characterization for the considered models. 
4. The Phelps characterization 
A natural characterization of optimal policy in a static model was obtained by E. 
Phelps (1973). As it was shown in Section 2 the optimal policy with commitment «respect 
the consumer welfare and the external debt» is consistent in time and coincides with the 
general stationary solution (see Section 1) which can be found from the static system of 
equations (6’),(5a)-(5d),(4’g),(4’h). We characterize it in the form of the Phelps’ type 
relation that is deduced below.  
Since the inference is the same for the static as well as growth model, we make it 
in terms of the latter (the difference is  that in the growth model π = θ -γ). We consider 
the government’s problem of choosing the stationary policy τ, θ, G, subject to its budget 
constraint, which maximizes the indirect consumer’s utility. System (5a)-(5d), (4’h), or 
(11а)-(11e) describes the  consumer’s solution corresponding to a given policy (τ, θ  , g). 
System (11а)-(11e) may be solved for  c, m, m*, l, λ in terms of constant policy 
parameters τ, θ, g. Let V(τ, θ , G) be the indirect consumer’s utility given policy τ, θ , g. 
The problem is: 
max V(τ, θ , g)                                                (12) 
τ f(l(τ, θ, g)) + (θ +r -γ)m(τ, θ , g)+(r -γ)m*(τ, θ, g) - g = d0(r -γ)+w0(r -γ).     (12а) 
Here the constants in the right side  depend  neither on time nor on policy. Really, w0 = 
b+m+m* is the stationary share of the consumer’s wealth in the full employment output , 
equal to its initial value, and analogously for the external debt d0=dt= at - bt according to 
the taken assumption. We assert that the solution of the problem (12) is the general 
stationary solution. In fact, the government’s budget constraint is obtained by summing 
the consumer’s budget  (11e) with resource balance (11f), so the variables l(τ, θ, g), m(τ, 
θ , g), m*(τ, θ, g) satisfying (12a) are equilibrium. The problem of maximization runs all 
stationary equilibria, and the general stationary solution is one of them. But the latter 
gives maximum to the consumer’s welfare in the dynamic problem if a part of the 
government policy consists in changing the consumer’s initial data (of course, ρ = r, and 
all transversality and no Ponzi game conditions are fulfilled). If all governments fulfill the 
mentioned above commitment, the general stationary solution is consistent in time. So 
there is a reason to take it as constant in time, and hence to characterize it in the 
framework of static problem (12).  
Let us outline the plan (essentially it will repeat the Phelps’ plan (1973)). We put 
down the derivatives of the indirect utility V on τ, θ , g; then differentiate the consumer’s 
budget (11e) on τ, θ  and g. Further making the necessary substitutions from the obtained 
expressions into the first order conditions of the problem (12), we get the required 
relation. 
Denote by Vτ , cτ and so on the corresponding partial derivatives at the optimal 
stationary trajectory. We write the derivatives Vτ , Vθ and Vg ,  taking into account the 
equilibrium relations (11a)-(11d) and omitting the constant multiplier, equal to the sum of 
discount: 
Vτ = Uc ⋅ [cτ + (θ + r - γ)mτ + (q+r)mτ* - (1-τ) f’(l)lτ ] ,  
Vθ = Uc ⋅ [cn +(θ + r - γ)mθ + (q+r)mθ* - (1-τ) f’(l)lθ ],                                 
Vg = Uc ⋅ [cg + (θ + r - γ)mg + (q+r)mg* - (1-τ) f’(l)lg ] + Ug .                          
We differentiate on τ , θ  and g the consumer’s budget constraint (11e) 
w0 (r -γ) + (1-τ)f(l)  -  (θ + r - γ) m - (q+r)m* - c - i(γ)  = 0,            
taking into account that the first and the last articles are constant. We get:  
f(l) + [cτ + (θ + r -γ)mτ + (q+r) mτ*  - (1-τ) f’(l)lτ ] = 0 ,                                
m + [cθ + (θ + r -γ)mθ + (q+r) mθ* - (1-τ) f’(l)lθ ] = 0 ,                               
 [cg +  (θ + r -γ)mg + (q+r) mg* - (1-τ) f’(l)lg ] = 0.                                
Substituting the brackets from the previous expressions we obtain:  
                                                      Vτ = - Uc  f(l) ,                                           (12’a)                              
Vθ = - Uc m.                                              (12’b) 
                                                             Vg  = Ug  .                                                                            (12’c)           
Now come back to the government problem (12). We can write its budget constraint (12a) 
in the more economical form: 
τ f(l(τ, θ , g)) + θ m (τ, θ , g) - g - a(τ, θ , g)(r -γ)  = 0.                (12b) 
(We remind that  a(τ, θ , g) is the share of summary government’s debt (internal and 
external) in the full employment output, and when the government by means of market 
operations changes the initial internal debt to the stationary one the sum also changes). 
Denote the left side of (12b), that is the difference between government’s incomes and 
expenditures induced by a given policy τ, θ , g  through Е(τ, θ , g): 
Е(τ, θ , g)= τ f(l(τ, θ , g)) + θ m (τ, θ , g) - g - a(τ, θ , g)(r -γ). 
The first order conditions for the problem (12) have the form: 
Vτ = - η Е(τ, θ , g)’τ  , 
Vθ = - η Е(τ, θ , g)’θ  , 
 Vg = -  η Е(τ, θ , g)’g , 
where η is the scalar Lagrange multiplier for the government’s budget constraint. 
Substituting here  the expressions (12’a)-(12’c) we obtain the final relation: 
 Е(τ, θ , g)’τ : f(l) = Е(τ, θ , g)’θ : m =- Е(τ, θ, g)’g : Ug / Uc =U’c /η =const>0.   (13) 
At γ = 0 relation (13) characterizes the consistent stationary policy for the model with 
zero rate of growth, considered in Section 1. The first equality in (13) means that the 
marginal contribution to the budget proficit of the labor income with respect to a unit of 
outcome is equal to the marginal contribution of the inflation tax with respect to  a unit of 
the real domestic money balances.  Relation (13) is an analog of the Phelp’s relation for 
the stationary growth model written in relative values. The second equality says that the 
same value has the marginal deduction from the budget of the government’s expenditures 
related to a unit of marginal utility taken in consumer equivalent.    
Thus one can conclude as follows. 
 Proposition 2.  Let a model of a small open economy of Sidrausky’s type with two 
currencies  admit a stationary growth and in this case the consumer’s utility function is 
homogenous (degree < 1) in consumption and real balances, and production function is 
linear in capital. If governments fulfill the commitment «to respect the consumer welfare 
and the external debt» and support the precise budget balance then the optimal 
stationary, and consistent in time policy is characterized by the relation (13). 
The presence of capital in the model did not prevent from obtaining the result due 
to the properties homogenity and linearity which allowed to reduce the model to one 
without capital. The initial capital  K0 determines the potential initial output, and 
associated with labor - real output which grow as well as other variables (except labor) at 
the rate γ.  
The Phelps’ assumption about invariability of sum of income effects is replaced 
here to the constraint on feasible policies at which the precise balance of governments‘ 
income and expenditures is satisfied.  
5. Calculations 
5.1 Optimal time-consistent policies. 
Let us consider the policy optimization problem in the case when  governments 
are free from  commitments on real money balances (p.2.2 and system (7’a)-(7’d)). We 
take a standard class of utility functions. This class known as CRRA (constant relative 
risk aversion) is widely used for modeling beginning from Kydland and Prescott (1982)): 
U = [(c1 -ν sν l -κgδ)1 -σ - 1]/(1-σ). 
Variable s = [(1-ξ)m-η + ξ m* -η] -1/η represents money services in transactions with 
imperfect substitution of currencies. Values m, m* denote correspondingly real money 
balances in domestic and foreign currencies. The definition of constants  ξ, η, ν, δ, κ, σ 
are given below in п. 5.2. For this type of utility functions derivatives Um and Um* are zero 
nowhere. So the Friedman rule with π = - r is impossible here, and (7’c) implies ν4 ≠ 0.  
We show that there is no  solution with ν4 ≠ 0.  
Suppose that there is a solution with ν4 ≠ 0. Substituting the parametrical form of 
utility function and omitting  quite cumbersome technical details one can reduce system 
(7’a)-(7’d) and (5b)-(5d) to the following form:  
g / c = δ /(1 - ν - ν /η),                                         (14a) 
τ = ν / [η(1 -ν)],                                              (14b)            
c = ν4 (q+r)η (1-ν) /ν,                                          (14c) 
m* / c = (1+η)ν / (q+r)[η -ν(1+ η)].                              (14d) 
с = (1-τ)(1-ν) fl l / k,                                          (14e)  
νξ /(1-ν) = [(1-ξ)(m*/m)η + ξ](q +r)m*/c                         (14f) 
c /{m[(1-ξ)+ξ(m/m*)η]} = (π+r)(1-ν) /ν(1-ξ).                        (14g) 
Show that system (14) has no solution. To this end we compare optimal and equilibrium 
relations concerning foreign currency, namely (14d) and (14f). It is easy to see that the 
multiplying gives: (m*/m)η = - ξ /(1 -ξ)(1-ν)(1+η).  Since 0<ξ < 1, 0<ν <1, and η > -1 
the right side of the previous equality is negative, while the left is positive. The 
contradiction shows that system (14) has no solution. Thus for the utility function under 
consideration the time-consistent solution «without commitments on real money 
balances» does not exist.  
Note that if utility function admits satiation in money the solution of system (7’a)-
(7’d) and (5b)-(5d) is reduced to the Friedman regime with ν4 =0 and zero taxes.  
The time-consistent solution with commitment to «respect the consumer welfare and 
external debt»  coincides with the general stationary solution which can be calculated 
from system (6’), (5a)-(5d),(4’g),(4’h). After substitution into the system utility function, 
production function, and following simplifications of the extremely awkward expressions 
we get the system (it is written in relative values: output f(l) is normalized to one, 
variables c, m, m*, g, d  are share of unit):  
System describing the general stationary solution 
(m*):  ν1+(π+r)(1-ν)ην3 ν- -1 + [(q+r) (1-ν)ην- -1 - (1+η)cm*(-1)]ν4 = 0, 
(m): ν1(1-ν)(1-α) - ν2κ(1-α)cl ζ-1 + ν3[-(1+η)cm -1 + (1-α+ ην- -1)(1-ν)(π+r)]+ 
ν4 (1-α+ ην- -1) (1-ν)(q+r) = 1 -  ν3 l -ζm -1 , 
(l):  ζ l ζ - ν1κ[(1-α)(1-ν) -1] (1-ν) -1(1-τ) -1 - ν2ζ l ζ-1[(2ζ -1)τ -1 -κ(1-α)] - ν3κ(1- 
α)(π+r) - ν4(1-α)(q+r)κ = 0, 
(g):  ν1 - ν2 cζ l ζ-1 + c l ζ - δ c2 l ζ g -1 (1-ν) -1 = 0, 
(λ):  ν1 - ν2 (1-τ)ζ l ζ-1 + ν3(π+r) + ν4 (q+r) = 0, 
(τ и π):  ν3 = ν2 mζ l ζ-1 ,  (s1 =Ucν3 m -1), 
(leq):  c = (1-τ)(1-ν)ζκ -1 , 
(m*eq):   cm*(-1) = (1-ν)(q+r)[ξ + (1-ξ)(m /m*) -η](νξ) -1 , 
(meq):   (m /m*) 1+η = (q+r)(1-ξ)(π+r) -1ξ -1 , 
(budget):   r(b+m+m*) + (1-τ) - c - (π+r)m - (q+r)m* = 0, 
(balance):  1 - c - g - qm* - rd = 0. 
Here the variables in brackets on the left mean what derivatives of Lagrangian are taken 
at this line. The last 5 equations represent the equilibrium conditions. Below after 
evaluations of the parameters we give the solution of the system. 
5.2 Evaluations of parameters. The parameters of production, consumer 
preferences, and government’s policy are evaluated by average values taken from the 
following Russian sources: Goscomstat RF, Russian statistical annual, and Short-time 
economic parameters, and also Central Bank of RF, Bulletin of bank statistics after 1998  
year. We give below the basic values of some parameters and fundamental proportions. 
Production. In the static model output is produced with one factor - labor l, and 
production function has the form: Y=lζ . We set  ζ = 0.5 which is equal to labor share in 
GDP in Russian national accounts. This corresponds to the case when capital stock is 
fixed that presupposes constant returns to scale and in this case labor can be thought of a 
composite of all factors. In the growth model we also set the standard for Russian 
economy  rate of depreciation of capital  δ = 0.1. 
Government policy. We set share of government spending to GDP g = 32% which reflects 
the share of expenditure of the consolidated Government in Russia.; we set constant b 
which is the internal debt-to-GDP ratio to 0.09 and constant d which is the 
external debt-to-GDP ratio to 0.35. We set rate of associated tax (i.e. federal tax and the 
subjects of Federation taxes) τ =32%. 
Preferences. We evaluate the basic values of parameters and variables of the utility 
function U = [(c1 -ν sν l -κ)1 -σ - 1]/(1-σ),  s = [(1-ξ)m-η + ξ m* -η] -1/η. 
Variables:  consumption c, normally takes values 66 - 68% GDP in static or in sum  with 
investment in the growth model;  labor l, 0 < l < 1, the value of  l approximately equal to 
1/3 (8 hours from 24),  about  values of m and  m* we say below. 
Parameters of utility function which are subject to evaluating:  
ν  is share of money services in utility function, 0< ν <1, 
ξ  is relative efficiency of foreign currency in production of money services, 0<ξ <1, 
κ  is  parameter of elasticity of labor supply, κ>0, 
 η  is  a parameter which determines elasticity of currency substitution w.r.t. ratio  
domestic to foreign interest rates. It is equal  1/(1+η) and ordinarily is taken more than 1, 
see Bufman and Leiderman (1992), Fridman and Verbetsky (2001). We find  η = -0.4, -
0.5 when keep the Russian financial proportions; 
σ  is risk aversion parameter, 1/σ is elasticity of intertemporal substitution which is not 
revealed from static model but determines  the rate of growth  by formula:  r = ρ + σγ,  
where the world real interest assumed to be fixed at 5%, 
ρ  is subjective discount factor; in the growth model we set ρ =0.03, then it is compatible 
with formula r = ρ + σγ, where we change parameter σ  between  0.3 and 0.5 in order to 
consider the rate of growth between  4% and 7%,. 
We set the rate of inflation of good in foreign currency q =0. Using the data on 
stock of foreign currency in circulation in Russia and ruble money supply we calculated 
the ratio of domestic and foreign money which turned out to be equal 6/5, i.e. 
dollarization surpasses 1/2. Assuming that domestic interest rate n= 15-20%, and foreign 
interest rate n*=5%, and using the first order conditions  (see below), one can get as a 
guide the parameter of relative efficiency of foreign currency ξ from relation: 
(1-ξ)(m*/m)1+η /ξ =n/n*. 
After substitution of indicated values we find ξ ≈ 0.21-0.25.  
An approximate evaluation for share of money services ν  can be got from the first 
order conditions, using the evaluations of share of consumption in GDP  с =0.65-0.7   ( 
this is together with investment), and the real money balances to consumption ratio m/c 
equal  to 1/8. These proportions give us approximate values for m=0.09 and m*=6m/5= 
0.11.   Substituting them to the first order condition one can  find that  ν changes between 
0.018 and 0.04. 
Elasticity of labor supply κ is evaluated now from the necessary condition (3.c) after 
substitution there the evaluated parameters  ζ , ν  and variables c= 0.7, l = 1/3 and τ 
=0.32. We get κ =0.4. 
The evaluated parameters are given in the  table: 
Para- 
меter 
Value or 
interval; 
 
Соntents 
 
ρ 0,05       Rate of preference (in growth model equal to 0.03) 
σ 0,7 risk aversion parameter 
m0  0,9                 initial share of real money balances in GDP 
b0 0,09 share of internal debt in GDP 
r 0,05 world real interest rate 
d0 0,35 share of external debt in GDP 
η -0,4 - 0,5  
 
1/(1+η) -
  
elasticity of substitution between currencies;  
ν 
0,015 - 0,04 
 
share of money services in utility function 
ξ 0.0 - 0,20 efficiency of foreign currency in production of money services 
κ 0,4 elasticity of labor supply 
δ 0,32 share of public goods in consumer’s utility function 
ζ 0,5 share of labor in GDP 
 
5.3 Analysis of optimal and equilibrium solutions. Calculating the optimal 
solution we tried to keep at least approximately the evaluated basic values of parameters 
and proportions. (The search of the solution was constrained by the possibilities of the 
mathematical program). The optimal solution shown itself very sensitive to changing the 
parameters, especially to that of currency substitution η. A stable result was found at very 
lower, close to zero, elasticity of currency substitution:  1/(1+η) < 0,01. Increasing this 
parameter brings about sharp growth of foreign currency balances m*, and the  lower 
level of substitution seems to serve as a barrier.  I give a line of other parameters of the 
corresponding solution. 
Parameters and variables of the general stationary solution  
(d=0,35, q=0, σ =0,7) 
ζ κ ξ ν δ τ π с m m* l g 
0,6
2 
0,60 0,25 0,029 0,4 0,34 10% 0,66 0.1 0,11 0,4 0,32 
 
Note that the general stationary solution is a solution of the Phelps’  problem where the 
consumer’s indirect utility positively depends on m*, while the government’s budget 
constraint does not include it. So at least outwardly one can expect that m* will increase 
at maximization. The barrier in the form of lower parameter of substitution keeps the 
value of m* at the desired level. The restraining role performs also the lower efficiency of 
dollar than that of ruble in transactions (ξ = 0,25). Below in equilibrium solutions this 
parameter plays the important role, see table 1. 
The main calculation work concerned equilibrium solutions. Given policies of 
taxes and expenditures I found an equilibrium supported by a rate of money emission.  
The ordinary solutions existed at much higher values of elasticity of currency substitution 
(more than 1), which can be met in the literature. In the sequel I take it so.  
Let us take five last equations of the system for the general stationary solution 
(5.1) and put them in equivalent form: 
Perfect foresight equilibrium conditions 
(1-ν)(1-τ)ζ  = κ c                                                                        (14’e) 
  ν(1-ξ)/(1-ν) = [1 - ξ + ξ(m*/m)-η](π +r)m/c                                 (14’f) 
νξ /(1-ν) = [(1-ξ)(m*/m)η + ξ](q +r)m*/c                                     (14’g) 
rb0 + (1-τ) - c - πm - qm* = 0                                                        (14’h) 
1 - c - g - qm* - rd0  = 0                                                                   (14’i) 
Here all real variables are the shares of outcome. As we see from (14’e) variable l 
disappears from system (14). This imposes a tie on the parameter of elasticity of labor 
supply k. Multiplying (14f) and (14g) gives: 
(m/m*)1+η = (q+r)(1-ξ) /[ξ (π+r)], 
that says that positive foreign nominal interest rate induce positive domestic interest rate.  
Здесь все реальные величины это доли  выпуска. Given basic values c =0.66, g=0,32, 
m=0,88, m*=0,11, τ =0,32, π = 0,2  we find from equations (14’f),(14’g) parameters  ν = 
0,04 and ξ =0,18, from (14’e) we find κ =0,49. Then setting η = -0,4 one can reproduce a 
solution of system (14’) close to the basic values. The influence of parameters η, ξ , ν,   q,  
d0, τ   on the equilibrium values of variables and welfare are given below in tables 1 - 7. 
We change one parameter while the others take the basic values:  
η = -0,4, ξ =0,18, ν = 0,04,  q =0, τ =0.32, g = 0.32, d0 =0.35, q=0.  
In tables 1- 4  с≈ 0,66, seniorage ≈ 0,018. 
Table 1 The influence of parameter η.  
η  ξ ν m  m* π % Welfare 
-0.5 0,18 0,0404 0,0831 0,114 21.7 0.610  
-0.45 0,18 0,0404 0,0908 0,106 19.8 0.611  
-0.4 0,18 0,0404 0,0930 0,104 19.4 0.612  
-0.35 0,18 0,0404 0,0942 0,103 19.1 0.612  
-0.3 0,18 0,0404 0,095 0,102 19.0 0.612  
-0.2 0,18 0,0404 0,096 0,101 18.8 0.613  
 
Table 1 shows that  the decrease of elasicity of dollar to ruble substitution from 2 till 1,25 
causes the decrease of share of dollars in outcome, decrease of rate of inflation , and the 
increase of share of ruble real balances and welfare.  
Table 2 Influence of parameter ξ . 
ξ ν m  m* π % η  Welfare   
0,17 0,04 0,102 0,09 17.7 -0.4 0.614  
0,16 0,04 0,114 0,077 15.7 -0.4 0.616  
0,15 0,04 0,125 0,066 14.4 -0.4 0.617  
0,1 0,04 0,162 0,029 11.1 -0.4 0.623  
0,05 0,04 0,184 0,008 9.8 -0.4 0.627  
0,02 0,04 0,191 0,001 9.4 -0.4 0.629  
 
Table 2 shows that decreasing of dollar efficiency causes the similar but more distinct  
monotonous dependence as in table 1.  
Table 3 Influence of parameter ν . 
ξ ν m  m* π % η  Welfare  
0,18 0,04 0,085 0,107 21.2 -0.4 0.611  
0,18 0,0402 0,09 0,105 20. -0.4 0.612  
0,18 0,045 0,173 0,090 10.4 -0.4 0.620  
0,18 0,05 0,248 0,088 7.2 -0.4 0.625  
 
One can see that the system sharply reacts on small changes of share of money services 
and in the similar way as it does in the previous tests. Thus the decrease of elasticity of 
currency substitution and decrease of dollar efficiency move stationary equilibria in the 
same favorable direction as a little increasing of share of money services.  
Table 4 Influence of the rate of foreign   inflation q. 
q % m  m* π % η  Welfare 
1 0,102 0,0746 17.6 -0.4 0.613 
2 0,113 0,056 16. -0.4 0.613 
3 0,121 0,044 14.9 -0.4 0.613 
4 0,127 0,035 14.2 -0.4 0.614 
5 0,131 0,029 13.7 -0.4 0.614 
 
One can see that given  elasticity of currency substitution η =1,66 the increasing q 
provokes the similar monotone changes of equilibrium values m, m*, π and U as in the 
previous tables.  
Table  5. Influence of tax rate τ . 
τ % g c m  m* π % Welfare  
33 0,33 0,652 0,0635 0,118 27.5 0.598 
32 0,321 0,662 0,085 0,107 21.2 0.611 
31 0,31 0,672 0,098 0,102 18.3 0.622 
30 0,30 0,682 0,110 0,0989 16.4 0.634 
29 0,291 0,692 0,121 0,0965 14.9 0.644 
28 0,281 0,702 0,131 0,0947 13.8 0.655 
 
One can see that the decresing of tax rate causes the increasing of consumption and the 
same favorable changes  of other variables as before. 
On the whole one can establish that  
the decreasing of elasticity of dollar to ruble substitution, or efficiency of dollar, 
or tax rate or 
the increasing of the share of money services (even very small), or foreign rate of 
inflation 
move the equilibrium to the favorable direction, namely: inflation and share of 
dollars go down, share of ruble real balances goes up and as the result the consumer 
welfare increases.  
 
Table  6. Influence of the external debt  d0. 
ξ ν 
 
d0 m m* π % c Seniorage
% 
Welfare      Losses from 
inflation % 
0.18 0.038 0.35 0.080 0.105 22 0.662 1.8 0.612      4 
0.2 0.034 0.3 0.083 0.101 18 0.665 1.5 0.620      3.5 
0.23 0.03 0.25 0.085 0.102 14 0.668 1.2 0.629      2.4 
0.25 0.027 0.2 0.083 0.102 12 0.67 1.0 0.634      1.8 
 
Table 7. Influence of the external debt when the efficiency of dollar ξ = 0. 
ν d0 m π % c Seniorage
% 
Welfare     Losses from 
inflation %
0.038 0.35 0.16 11 0.662 1.8 0.628       4.1 
0.034 0.3 0.16 8.9 0.665. 1.54 0.635       3.3 
0.03 0.25 0.17 6.9 0.668 1.12 0.641       2.5 
0.027 0.2 0.17 5.8 0.67 1.0 0.646       1.9 
 
In tables 6 and 7 we give the solutions where the external debt taken under 5% is equal 
correspondingly to 0.35, 0.3, 0.25 , 0.2 of GDP. The gains from decreasing the debt are 
obvious. So essential decreasing the debt makes to correct the parameters. We corrected 
parameters ξ and ν  so that  to keep the real proportions  m/c ≈1/8,  m*/m ≈ 6/5, с ≈ 0.665. 
In the column «Losses of inflation %» are given the welfare losses with respect to rate of 
inflation π = - 4%. 
5.4 Losses from dollarization. Let us compare two  models: one with foreign 
currency for which m*/m ≈ 6/5, and another without foreign currency. The latter means 
that efficiency of dollar ξ is set equal zero  (while the other parameters remain the same) 
and the corresponding equation disappears. The tables 6 and 7 allow to evaluate the losses 
from dollarization for different values of external debt in the economy with current other 
proportions. From comparison of two tables one can see that when debt is equal 0.35 GDP 
rate of inflation in the model with foreign currency is about 10% higher and welfare is  
2.6%  lower than in that without foreign currency. In table 2 we could also observe the 
growth of welfare about 2,5% when the dollar efficiency  decreases till zero. The similar 
picture with smaller differences takes place for lower debts 0.3,.0.25, 0.2. One could 
propose the following reasons for this losses. Dollar substitutes ruble in transactions until 
its efficiency ξ >0. Assume that because of institutional or other causes the efficiency 
became close to zero. All money services are fulfilled by ruble. Its real quantity increases 
(from 0.08 till 0.16). Without printing new money it can be only due to lowering prices. A 
new equilibrium is set with lower rate of inflation corresponding to the increased real 
money balances. Since ruble is essentially more efficient in transactions than dollar (it 
economizes more resources), utility value will become bigger than before. The decreasing 
of debt implies the sensitive decreasing of rate of inflation, seniorage, and losses from 
inflation. Decreasing from 0.35 till 0.3 of GDP results in decreasing the rate of inflation 
on 12%, increasing the consumer’s welfare on 1.4%, while the losses from inflation 
becomes less on 0.9%.  
In a  more specific investigation Friedman and Verbetsky (2001) note that the 
effect of dollarization is negative when the rate of inflation is lower, and positive at high 
rates of inflation. Obviously the authors consider rate of inflation as  high if it is ≥ 2% per 
month when the economy get the non-efficient part of Laffer curve. In our case the  rate 
of inflation is not much higher than 20% per year. So one can say that our conjecture 
about losses of dollarization does not contradict their conclusion. 
4. Conclusion 
We considered a model of a small open economy with foreign currency. The latter 
is  of interest because Russian economy is a high «dollarized» country, and moreover the 
level of dollarization seems to be excessively high. Mechanism of this phenomenon is not 
modeled, instead the real level of dollarization ≈6:5 is simply forced upon. Calculation of 
equilibrium regimes with real parameters of policy shown that the effect of dollarization 
is negative. All the tests witnesses that the decreasing of share of foreign currency and the 
increasing share of domestic one imply fall of inflation and growth of consumer’s 
welfare. The welfare losses in comparison with the model without foreign currency and 
given proportions in Russian economy turned out to be ≈ 2.5%.  Calculation of the 
optimal regime shown that the model is obviously insufficient for describing the role of 
foreign currency in economy. Here the solution close to real data comes out in the 
optimum at very lower (almost zero) parameter of currency substitution. This fact needs 
to be verified more carefully. 
 The theoretical and  practical parts of this work were aimed to  studying stationary 
solutions of dynamic models. In connection with this I considered optimal time-consistent 
solutions with different governments’ commitments. For the case «without commitment 
to inherit real money balances» time-consistent solution is reduced to the Friedman 
regime. For the commitment  «respect the accumulated consumer’s welfare and external 
debt» ( that is an analog of Auernheimer’s condition of «honest» government here) the 
time-consistent  solution is described by a static system of equations. The similar system 
(only in terms of shares of full employment output) describes the time consistent solution 
in the model of stationary growth with production function of type AK-Romer. In  both 
models the optimal time consistent solutions are characterized by a a relation of the 
Phelps’ type. 
I calibrated the model  taking as basic the real  proportions. The following 
parameters’ values resulted from the calibration: η ≈ -0,4,  ξ ≈ 0,18, ν ≈ 0.04. For 
comparison,  Friedman and  Verbetsky (2001) chose: ξ (their λ) ≈ 0.2,  ν (their γ) = 0.05, 
and η ≈ -0,5. The influence of the parameters on the equilibrium solutions increases in the 
following order: elasticity of currency substitution η, efficiency of dollar ξ (more strong), 
share of money services ν (very strong).The behavior of the system is quite natural: the 
decreasing of efficiency of foreign currency, or tax rate, or increasing share of money 
services brings about the increase of the consumer welfare. The effect of currency 
substitution is clearly seen, as well as that of growth of   rate of foreign inflation: real 
dollar balances go down, real ruble balances go up, and the rate of inflation decreases.  
In order for not to overload the paper I did not include the calculations on the 
model of stationary growth with quite similar effects.  
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